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EMINENT DOMAIN - PROCEDURE - RELATION OF JUDGE AND
JURY IN MICHIGAN 'CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS - *The relation-
ship of judge to jury in Michigan condemnation proceedings
presents in many ways a merger of some of the problems and ques-
tions contained in the relationship of judge to jury in civil trials,
and of court to tribunal in administrative law. Theorists as well as
the practicing lawyer in Michigan and some other states" may well
find in the development of the Michigan condemnation proceed-
ing an interesting example of the growth of a procedure for ad-
judication, in a context of cross-fire between legislative ideas and
judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision.
I. The Problem
The Constitution of 18502 was the first in Michigan to contain
a provision which required, in condemnation cases, that the neces-
sity for taking and the amount of compensation be determined by
a "jury of twelve free-holders, residing in the vicinity of such prop-
erty... ." This provision3 reads as follows:
"When private property is taken for the use or benefit of the
public, the necessity for using such property and the just com-
pensation to be made therefor, except when to be made by
* This comment was originally prepared as a report to the Michigan State Bar Com-
mittee on Condemnation Procedures by Mr. Jackson, under the supervision of Professor
Paul G. Kauper of the University of Michigan Law School. The committee's permission
to publish this report is gratefully acknowledged.-Ed.
1 Twenty states have provisions in their constitutions requiring some sort of jury
procedure for some or all condemnation cases. The states, date of the constitution, and
article and section of relevant provisions are as follows: Alabama (1901) §235; Arizona
(1910) 11:17; California (1879) 1:14; Colorado (1876) 11:15; Florida (1885) XVI:29; Illinois
(1870) 11:13; Iowa (1857) 1:18; Kentucky (1891) §242; Missouri (1945) 1:26; Montana
(1889) 111:15; New York (1938); 1:7; North Dakota (1889) 1:14; Ohio (1851) 1:19, XIII:5;
Oklahoma (1907) 11:24; Pennsylvania (1874) XVI:8; South Carolina (1895) IX:20; South
Dakota (1889) VI:13, XVII:18; Washington (1889) 1:16; West Virginia (1872) 111:9;
Wisconsin (1848) XI:2. For a slightly out-of-date compendium of state constitutional
provisions bearing on condemnation, see RANDOLPH, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN 401-
416 (1894). See also 74 A.L.R. 569 (1931). Of the twenty state provisions cited above,
eleven provide that the jury proceeding shall be "according to law," or "as prescribed by
law," including Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington.
2The first Michigan Constitution was adopted in 1835. One revision subsequent to
1850 was adopted in 1908.
3 MICH. CONsT., Art. XVIII, §2 (1850). This section, in substantially unchanged form,
is now Art. XIII, §2. Other provisions in the 1850 constitution relevant to condemnation
are Art. XV, §9, providing for compensation before taking; Art XV, §15, providing for
taking in cities and villages with a jury requirement; Art. XVII, §14, providing for
opening of private roads with a jury requirement.
the state, shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve free-holders,
residing in the vicinity of such property, or by not less than
three commissioners, appointed by a court of record, as shall
be prescribed by law: Provided, The foregoing provision shall
in no case be construed to apply to the action of commission-
ers of highways in the official discharge of their duty as high-
way commissioners."
4
The major interpretative problem of this section is the mean-
ing of "jury" in this context.5 Although it may be thought that
this term refers to a proceeding before a jury similar to that used
in common law jury trials, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated
on numerous occasions that, "These appraisals bear no resemblance
to ordinary legal trials.. ."6 and that it is "settled in this State that
the jury contemplated by this section... is a special tribunal.... -
In defining proceedings by this "special tribunal," the Mich-
igan court has stipulated that these juries "are judges of the law
and fact ... " ,I" This has led the court to conclude that, "the pre-
siding judge acts only in an advisory capacity and cannot give
binding instructions . . ." and, furthermore, the judge may re-
fuse to give advisory instructions even when requested to do so.10
A good example of the confusion that these principles can en-
gender is contained in a 1939 case" where the judge and jury
were faced with the question who should decide the constitu-
tionality of the federal housing act!
It must be remembered that we are dealing with a constitu-
tional provision which limits and controls the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain entrusted to the legislature.12
In each condemnation there is a statute supplying the eminent
domain authority, and this statute must be followed unless it
4 The proviso was added in 1860. See I Mich. Stat. Ann. (1936) §190.
5 No attempt will be made to consider proceedings under commissioners, although the
Michigan court has indicated that commissioners have "the same powers and duties as a
jury .. ." in condemnation cases. In re State Highway Commissioner, 249 Mich. 530 at
532, 229 N.W. 500 (1930). See also Port Huron & South-Western Ry. v. Voorheis, 50 Mich.
506, 15 N.W. 882 (1883); and Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Detroit & Bay City R. Co.,
64 Mich. 350, 31 N.W. 281 (1887).
6 Matter of Convers, 18 Mich. 459 at 468 (1869).
7 McDuffee v. Fellows, 157 Mich. 664 at 668, 122 N.W. 276 (1909).
8 Ibid.
9 In re Acquisition of Land for Civic Center, 335 Mich. 582 at 591, 56 N.W. (2d) 387
(1953).
10 Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Detroit & Bay City R. Co., 64 Mich. 350, 31 N.W.
281 (1887), and McDuffee v. Fellows, 157 Mich. 664, 122 N.W. 276 (1909).
11 In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313 at 347, 289 N.W. 493 (1939).
12 RANDOLPH, EMINENT DOMAIN 91 (1894).
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is contrary to the constitution. In this comment attention will be
focused on the characteristics of the "jury" (hereafter termed the
"condemnation jury") proceeding required by the condemnation
provision in the Michigan Constitution. These characteristics
are of at least two types, those required as a matter of constitu-
tional law, and those not required by the constitution but re-
quired by legislation or court interpretation of legislative and
public policy. The frequent failure of the Michigan Supreme
Court to distinguish sharply between these two types of charac-
teristics has led to some of the confusion in the condemnation
proceedings.
The purpose of this study is to give the reader a basic under-
standing of the nature of the Michigan condemnation jury, its
origin (insofar as information on this exists) and its theory as
developed by the Michigan Supreme Court. Such an understand-
ing is interesting as a specific example of the development of
a particular type of adjudicatory proceeding, not altogether
unique,1s but different from most. In any case no attempt has here
been made to set out every characteristic of the Michigan condem-
nation jury proceedings, nor exhaustively to cite the cases bearing
on this subject. Other works exist for this purpose.14
II. The Dim Past
Over a century of time has obscured the ideas and notions
of law which may have influenced the Michigan judges in their
early interpretations of the condemnation section. The decisions
themselves are somewhat cryptic concerning these sources. Infor-
mation on perhaps the most important source of interpretation,
the intent of the framers, is almost non-existent, as will be in-
dicated below. Consequently one finds himself groping among
ideas and institutions which existed in the days just before and
after 1850, in order to see if any of them might have a logical
or psychological connection to the later interpretations being
studied.
A. Early Eminent Domain Proceedings
Authorities seem to agree that at common law, prior to con-
stitutions, it was "the practice in America and England to as-
Is See note I supra.
14 See, e.g., 8 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE, Eminent Domain §§76-187
(1958); 5 MICHIGAN LAW AND PRAcriE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Condemnation §§91-120 (1956).
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certain the compensation to be paid for property taken for pub-
lic use by other agencies than a common law jury . . . ,"15 one
author describing the proceeding as "an inquisition on the part
of the state for the ascertainment of a particular fact .. . [that]
*.. may be conducted without the intervention of a jury .... 10
Consequently, constitutional provisions, such as the Seventh
Amendment, ensuring the right of trial by jury as it was known
prior to the Federal Constitution did not require a jury in con-
demnation proceedingsY' The 1835 Michigan constitutional pro-
vision that "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate"' 8
likewise did not require a jury in condemnation proceedings.
Constitutions of some states, however, specifically required a
jury in condemnation cases.' 9 In such cases authorities seem also
to agree that the "jury" mentioned is usually a common-law jury
of twelve men.20 An exception to this rule is stated by one author
who notes that "if a special jury is the tribunal in vogue at the
enactment of the constitution it may be presumed to be the jury
intended .... 21 This was evidently the approach taken by New
York after a section was introduced into its constitution in 1846
which guaranteed compensation for condemnation for a private
road to be "determined by a jury of freeholders .... -22 The New
York Court of Appeals in 1854 held that a majority of this jury
could make the determination, since instances of statutory con-
demnation proceedings prior to 1846
"are certainly sufficient to' establish the position that at the
time of the convention there was a known legislative usage in
respect to this subject, according to which the term "jury" did
not necessarily import a tribunal consisting of twelve men act-
ing only upon a unanimous determination, but on the con-
trary was used to describe a body of jurors of different num-
bers and deciding by majorities or otherwise as the legislature
in each instance directed .... "23
15 2 LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed., §509 (1909).
16 MILLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 2d ed., §91 (1888).
17 Ibid.; and PROFFATT, TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JuRY §104 (1877).
18 Art. I, §9.
19 RANDOLPH, EMINENT DOMAIN 289 (1894).
20 Ibid.; and 2 LEwIS, EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed., §509 (1909).
21 RANDOLPH, EMINENT DOMAIN 290 (1894).
22 New York Constitution of 1846, Art. I, §7, which reads substantially the same as
the present New York Constitution of 1938.
2 3 Cruger v. Hudson River R. Co., 12 N.Y. 190 at 199 (1854).
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Condemnation procedures in Michigan prior to 1850 were
found in the early Michigan statutes (special incorporation acts,
acts concerning roads, acts incorporating towns and villages, etc.).
Only one of these statutes provided that the necessity of the taking
be determined by a jury,24 the others providing that the damages
be assessed by:
"five disinterested persons to meet on the land . .; 25
"twelve respectable freeholders not interested in the land
.*; 
26
"three disinterested persons, freeholders . . . ;-27
"a jury of eighteen freeholders of said county ... ;-28
"twelve freeholders in the county.., each party... may strike
off three . . . the remainder shall act as a jury of inquest of
damage . . . ;,,9
"a panel of twelve.., the remaining six shall sit as a jury of
inquest of damages . . . ;'30
"commissioners . . . ;,
"six disinterested freeholders of the county in which the land
lies .... "32
It seems clear from a perusal of these statutes that condemnation
proceedings were considered to be completely within the control
of the legislature, and generally were a special type of proceeding
unrelated to normal civil trials.33
B. Inquests
The Michigan condemnation jury has been termed a "jury of
inquest" by the Michigan Supreme Court,3 4 so our groping for
243 Mich. Laws 214 at 217 (No. 115, 1839).
25 1 Terr. Laws of Mich. 75 at 77 (1805).
26 2 Terr. Laws of Mich. 93 at 94 (1817).
272 Terr. Laws of Mich. 593 at 594 (1827).
283 Terr. Laws of Mich. 1287 at 1289 (1834).
29 Mich. Laws (1836) 267 at 272.
30 Mich. Laws (1847) 5 at 12.
31 Mich. Laws (1847) 174 at 176.
32 Mich. Laws (1847) 114 at 116.
33 This was before the Fourteenth Amendment applied the due process requirements
to the states. The Michigan Constitution of 1835 stated that "The property of no person
shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor" (Art. I, §19), and there
is indication in at least one early case that certain elemental standards of fairness and
impartiality might be required of condemnation proceedings. See People ex rel. Green
v. Michigan Southern R. Co., 3 Mich. 496 at 504 (1855) (condemnation prior to 1850).
However, no Michigan cases have been found specifying required characteristics of con-
demnation proceedings prior to 1850.
34 Chicago & Michigan Lake Shore R. Co. v. Sanford, 23 Mich. 418 at 424 (1871).
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sources must include a brief review of the meaning of a "jury of
inquest" prior to 1850.
In a general sense an "inquest" can refer to any "body of men
appointed by law to inquire into certain matters." 35 However,
an inquest usually refers to a judicial inquiry, often with a jury,36
such as a coroner's inquest. Two types of inquests in particular
might have supplied analogies or precedents for terming a con-
demnation proceeding an inquest. One of these is the inquest of
office, wherein a jury summoned by a sheriff or other proper
officer inquired of matters relating to the crown upon evidence
laid before them. This type of inquiry could be for the purpose of
inquiring into matters that entitle "the king to the possession
of lands or tenements, goods or chattels, . . ." and could be made
"by a jury of no determinate number, either twelve, or less, or
more. . . ."37 Another type of inquest interesting to us is the
"inquest of damages." When default was entered in a cause of
action, and the damages were unliquidated, a "Writ of Inquiry"
would be used to call a jury to determine the amount of the dam-
ages.38 In an inquest for damages, the jury sat before and under
the instruction of the sheriff, although if an important question
of law were involved a judge might instruct the jury. The normal
rules of evidence were not relaxed, and the jury's determination
could be set aside like any other judicial proceeding.39 However,
one authority indicates that the jury's conclusion would not be set
aside unless it was manifest that injustice had been done.40
C. The Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1850
Unfortunately neither the Journal 1 nor the report of the de-
bates42 of the 1850 constitutional convention in Michigan contain
any discussion concerning section 2 of Article XVIII as finally
adopted. This provision was introduced, referred to the committee
on miscellaneous provisions,4 3 and, when the article on miscella-
neous provisions was reported to the convention, there was no
35 Bouvimt's LAw DICTIONARY (1914).
386 Ibid.; and 43 C.J.S. 1208, Inquest (1945).
37 KENNEDY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JURIES 122 (1826).
38 13 CYCLoPEDA OF LAw AND PROCEDURE 220-254 (1904).
39 Id. at 225-227. See also 195 LAw TiMES 22 (1943).
40 13 STANDARD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PROCEDURE 421 (1916).
41JouRNAL OF THE CONSTITETONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1850).
4 2 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CON-
sTrUTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1850).
43 JouRNAL, note 41 supra, at 51.
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debate on the particular section finally numbered (2) .44 There
was, however, some debate on a provision in the same article (later
eliminated from the article) which provided that when mill dams
flowed land, "the actual value of the land flowed shall be deter-
mined by a jury of freeholders, .. ."45 such value to be paid to
the landowner. One member of the convention spoke opposing the
motion to strike this mill dam provision, saying,
"This provision was intended to protect the poor man in his
rights. On but too many occasions were the poor men driven
out of court when seeking for their rights, by reason of the
costs arising from these suits. It only asked that these men
should have their rights, but through a different channel
from that now existing. It said that property should be
assessed by a jury of twelve men - the same tribunal which
had control over cases of a similar character. Gentlemen
might say, let them go to the courts of justice. But then we
had had experience in regard to that remedy. What did
going to the courts of justice, to the court of last resort,
amount to? To an utter rejection of claims for justice, so
far as the poor clients were concerned. '48
Whether this argument was also made for the provision on con-
demnation that was adopted by the convention is impossible to
say from a reading of the debates. The evidence of the framers'
intent when they established the condemnation jury is virtually
non-existent, however, unless we consider such threads as this.
III. Theories and Concepts of the Condemnation
Jury Subsequent to 1850
Two designations have frequently been applied to the con-
demnation jury by the Michigan Supreme Court. First, the court
has termed the "jury" a "special tribunal," differing from a com-
mon law jury.47 Second, the court has stated on a large number
of occasions that the condemnation jury is "judge of law and
fact." 48 The origin and development in the cases of these two rules
44 REPORT, note 42 supra, at 822-855. No reports or documents of the Committee on
Miscellaneous Provisions, if any exist, were found in the libraries at the University of
Michigan, nor were any pertinent newspaper or other accounts of its deliberations found
there. Time prevented search elsewhere in the state.
45 REPORT, note 42 supra, at 823.
46 Id. at 845-846.
47 See note 7 supra.
48 See notes 7 and 9 supra, and In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, 306
Mich. 373 at 387-389, 10 N.W. (2d) 920 (1943).
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is highly interesting, although the rules are so well established in
precedent that it may seem fruitless to inquire into their correct-
ness. Nevertheless, if either of these rules can be shown to rest on
weak or doubtful grounds, then as a matter of constitutional law
the Michigan Supreme Court may in the future be willing to limit
precedent narrowly and not use one or both of these concepts to
overrule the legislature when and if the latter prescribes a pro-
cedure that might not be considered strictly consistent with the
implications of these concepts.
A. The "Special Tribunal"
If the new condemnation provision in the 1850 constitution
was intended merely to codify and give constitutional protection
to the general method of assessing damages in condemnation cases
prior to 1850, there would seem to be no question but that con-
demnation proceedings would be by a special tribunal (not a
common law jury) as governed by the particular statute in the case,
within the explicit limits (twelve freeholders from the vicinity)
set out by the constitution. On the other hand, if the 1850 con-
stitution was intended to change the prior law in some way, then it
might be that certain common law features of a jury trial could
be demanded by right, even though not provided by legislation.
The words in the provision itself read "as shall be prescribed by
law... " which could be interpreted to mean that the legislature
can control the procedures within the explicit limits of the pro-
vision.
One early case, relying partly on another provision in the 1850
constitution, 49 suggested that the constitution intended to change
the mode of laying out highways.50 Other cases, however, have
indicated a predilection on the part of the court to determine the
nature of the constitutional condemnation jury by reference to the
procedures prior to 1850, particularly those in the railroad laws.
For instance, one case,51 after mentioning proceedings under the
old railway laws, states:
49 Art. X, §11, which provides: "The board of supervisors of each organized county
may provide for laying out highways, constructing bridges, and organizing townships under
such restrictions and limitations as shall be prescribed by law."
50 "It manifestly was the intention of the constitutional convention of 1851 to surround
the rights of individuals with additional guards, and to place them upon as sound a basis
as was consistent with the rights and necessities of the public. People v. Kimball, 4
Mich. 95 at 97 (1856).




"Our present system is better calculated than the old one,
if fairly applied, to secure the rights of landowners. But the
nature of the proceeding remains as before, a special pro-
ceeding by a temporary tribunal selected for the occasion,
and not a judicial proceeding in the ordinary sense."
The first case involving the question whether the constitutional
condemnation jury was to be the same as the jury in normal civil
trials was an appeal in which the Michigan court set aside the pro-
ceeding because, inter alia, a peremptory challenge was allowed
against one juror summoned for the case.52 The court, noting that
peremptory challenges were allowed only in criminal cases unless
explicitly authorized by statute, held that a statute providing per-
emptory challenges in "civil cases" did not apply to the condemna-
tion proceeding being reviewed.53 The court did not hold, how-
ever, that the legislature could not prescribe a procedure for con-
demnation like that in common law civil trials. It merely held that
the legislature did not so prescribe, and that the constitution did
not require a normal common law civil procedure.
The next case to touch on this problem 54 held that a writ of
certiorari was a proper way to review a condemnation proceeding,
since the constitution required a jury, the statute required a venire
and judgment, and no other provision was made for appeals. The
court said, "We think the proceedings so far judicial in their nature
as to be subject to revision . ..,,,55 but noted that it was disposing
of the case "without deciding how far the Justice is connected with
the inquest . . .,"56 intimating that the proceeding was not neces-
sarily similar to common law jury trials.
A third case, Chicago & Michigan Lake Shore R. Co. v. Sanfordy5 7
involved the issue of whether the condemnation jury must render
its verdict by unanimous vote. The court held that despite infer-
ences in the authorizing statute to the contrary, 58 it must be con-
52 Matter of Convers, 18 Mich. 459 (1869).
53 The court stated that the term "civil cases," .does not apply to special pro-
ceedings not in the ordinary course of law, and which are regulated entirely by particular
statute.... In the recent case of Livermore vs. Hamilton, in the New York Court of Appeals
(reported in the New York Times of May 10) it was held ... that it was error to allow a
peremptory challenge in proceedings under the Landlord and Tenant law, as such pro-
ceedings were not properly civil actions. These appraisals bear no resemblance to ordinary
legal trials." Id. at 468.
54 People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57 (1870).
55 Id. at 69.
56Id. at 71.
57 23 Mich. 418 (1871).
58 Mich. Comp. Laws (1857) §1965.
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strued so as to require a unanimous verdict in order to comply with
the constitutional guarantee of a jury. The court took issue with
the 1854 New York case 59 stating that a condemnation jury may
act by majority. The Michigan court said, "If a jury does not mean
a body acting substantially like a common-law jury it means noth-
ing at all; and the provision is senseless." 60 The court went on to
comment, however, that it was speaking of a "jury of inquest"
such as those denominated by the old railroad charters, which it
felt could "consist of more or less than twelve" but it doubted that
"there ever was any . . . idea that a verdict of twelve or less would
be valid that was not unanimous."
These three early cases seem to indicate a stand on the part of
the Michigan court that, despite the clause "as shall be prescribed
by law," a "jury of twelve free-holders" was to have a definite con-
tent beyond the explicit word, which would limit the legislature in
its selection of proceedings for condemnation cases. On the other
hand, the court seemed clearly to indicate that the condemnation
jury is not necessarily to be like an ordinary common-law jury in
all respects.
In the case of Paul v. Detroit61 the same judge who wrote the
Sanford opinion stated what he considered to be some of the char-
acteristics of the tribunal, as follows:
"... each case shall be determined by a separate tribunal sum-
moned expressly for the purpose, who must be unanimous
in their views before any land can be taken; who must act
openly and before all concerned, in hearing and receiving
testimony; who cannot listen to private persuasion, and where
any attempt to influence them will subject the offender to
severe and disgraceful punishment. All these safeguards are
implied in the use of the term 'jury;' and no action, by laws,
or by proceedings under them, can be maintained, if any of
these securities are impaired or disregarded."
In light of this background, the case of Wixom v. Bixby,62
decided in 1901, is extremely interesting. In that case one party
to a condemnation proceeding sought to use the testimony of a
juror in the proceeding to prove that the jury had illegally used a
quotient method of arriving at the condemnation award. The
question was whether such testimony could be admitted, and it
59 See note 23 supra.
023 Mich. 418 at 424 (1871).
6132 Mich. 108 at 114 (1875).
62 127 Mich. 479 at 484, 86 N.W. 1001 (1901).
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was held that since such testimony would be inadmissible if the jury
were a common-law jury, then such testimony would be inadmissible
here also, if the condemnation jury were a common-law jury.
The court concluded that the juror's testimony was inadmissible.
The court quoted a contemporary authority 3 to the effect that if a
constitution requires a jury without explanatory words, that jury
means the tribunal established by the common law. The court
then stated, ". . our Constitution has expressly provided for a
jury trial, without using explanatory words, in condemnation pro-
ceedings. Applying the rule as stated in Elliott, this means a com-
mon-law jury."
Of the three early cases discussed above, only Paul v. Detroit
was cited in the Wixom opinion, but the words quoted from the
Paul case above were used in the Wixom case to support the prop-
osition that the 1850 constitution changed the prior law and estab-
lished a jury in condemnation cases like that in common law cases.
Later cases, however, seem to ignore Wixom v. Bixby.6 4
In summary, then, it must be concluded that despite Wixom v.
Bixby and other inferences to the contrary, the Michigan Supreme
Court takes the position that the "jury of twelve freeholders"
guaranteed in condemnation cases by the constitution has certain
characteristics of a common-law jury but is not identical to a com-
mon-law jury. Furthermore, these characteristics are guaranteed
by the constitution, and consequently the legislature after 1850 no
longer had as much freedom to define the procedure to be followed
in condemnation cases.
B. The Jury as "Judge of Law and Fact"
The phrase "judge of law and fact" has influenced the Mich-
igan court in its decisions on specific characteristics of the con-
demnation jury,65 so it is interesting and important to trace the
origin of the use of this phrase in connection with the condemna-
tion jury.
63 ELLIorr, A TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADs AND STRErS, 2d ed., §196 (1900).
64 E.g., in McDuffee v. Fellows, 157 Mich. 664, 122 N.W. 276 (1909), the court held
that a probate judge properly could refuse to charge the jury in a condemnation case,
stating at 665-666: ".... in view of the decisions of this court interpreting the section in
question, we think that it must be held as established that the tribunal contemplated by
this section of the Constitution is a special tribunal, and that, while the tribunal when con-
sisting of a jury has some of the incidents of a common-law jury, the requirement that
such jury shall be instructed by the court is not one of those incidents. Wixom v.
Bixby was not mentioned.
(5 See note 48 supra.
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Perhaps the most important implications of the jury as "judge
of law and fact" are the possibilities that such a definition prevents
the judge from instructing the jury or ruling on law (or evidence)
questions as they arise during the trial. The later cases on these
questions will be discussed in the paragraphs below on specific
characteristics, but the early cases must be viewed at this point for
the light they shed on the development of the "judge of law and
fact" rule.
The earliest cases after 1850 in condemnation proceedings
seem to indicate that the judge could instruct the jury. In Duf-
field v. Detroit66 the court, in refusing to review a condemnation
proceeding because the record was not complete, noted without
taking exception a statute specifically providing that the court
should "instruct said jury as to their duties, and the law applicable
to the case. . .".. Subsequently, the court, in restraining con-
demnation proceedings because of constitutional defects in the
authorizing legislation, nevertheless indicated that the provision
made for instruction by the court was correct, although perhaps
it did not go far enough.6 7
Perhaps the starting point of the cases that later talk of the
jury as "judge of law and fact" is the case of Michigan Air Line Ry.
v. Barnes.68 In this case the court affirmed a condemnation award,
overruling two objections to rules by which the jury determined
the amount of the award and objections to the evidence taken by
the jury. The court's discussion did not mention constitutional
limitations, but centered on the interpretation of the authorizing
statute69 which provided that the judge could attend the jury, to
decide questions of law and administer oaths.
On the question of review of admission or exclusion of evidence
in the court below, the reviewing court indicated that it would
exercise considerable restraint because
"The statute plainly assumes that the jury may conduct the
inquiry without the aid of any legal expert, and under cir-
06 15 Mich. 474 at 485 (1867).
67 Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108 (1875). At 117 the court stated: "The law does not
presume the jury will be able to guide themslves, and when it requires the court, in
connection with its instructions, to deliver a copy of the notice.. . it is to be presumed
the jury in acting will pay special regard to the notice....
68 44 Mich. 222, 6 N.W. 651 (1880).
09 Mich. Laws (1873) p. 496 at 516 (Act of May 1, 1873), which stated in part: "The
said judge, or a circuit court commissioner to be designated by him, may attend such
jury, to decide questions of law and administer oaths to witnesses, and he may appoint the




cumstances in which it would be difficult, if not imprac-
ticable, to preserve technical or hair-drawn questions in a
shape to be reviewed.... The conclusion to which these and
other considerations lead is that a very large discretion in
admitting and rejecting testimony is left to the jury, or the
attending officer, whenever there is one .... ,70
The court did, however, review the jury's determination of the
legal rules by which it determined the award amount, although the
court affirmed the jury's view on these two matters.
The leading and first case stating the jury to be judge of law
and fact in condemnation cases is Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Dunlap.7 1 Although the court in this case reversed
various orders of the lower court regarding a condemnation pro-
ceeding, it affirmed the jury's finding of necessity despite the fact
that the circuit judge "attended the sittings of the jury, and ad-
mitted or excluded testimony, and charged the jury precisely as on
a trial."7 2 The court said:
"The judge formed no part of this special tribunal. The
statute indeed allows the judge to "attend said jury, to de-
cide questions of law and administer oaths to witnesses."
§21, art. 273 ... Whatever the language of this statute literally
construed may mean, it is very clear that any such functions
must at most be advisory. The jury will undoubtedly be
regarded as accepting and doing what they permit to be done.
But in all such cases the Constitution as well as the principles
of the common law, makes them judges of law and fact.
Chamberlin v. Brown 2 Doug. (Mich.) 120. Their conclu-
sions are not based entirely on testimony. They are expected
to use their own judgment and knowledge from a view of the
premises, and their experience as freeholders. ... -74
In short, the court held that the jury is judge of law and fact by
the constitution and therefore even if the judge purports to rule
on law and evidence this will not be grounds for reversal because:
"while an appellate court is bound ... to set aside proceedings
... based on false principles, it cannot properly deal With rulings
as if they were excepted to on a common law trial . . .,,75 once
70 Michigan Air Line Ry. v. Barnes, 44 Mich. 222 at 226, 6 N.W. 651 (1880).
7147 Mich. 456, 11 N.W. 271 (1882).
I721d. at 466.
73 See note 69 supra.
7447 Mich. 456 at 466.
75 Ibid.
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again citing the Chamberlin case, as well as Michigan Air Line Ry.
v. Barnes.
What led the court in this case to conclude the jury was to be
judge of law and fact in condemnation cases, as a matter of constitu-
tional law? Early in the opinion the court referred to the fact that
certain condemnation proceedings under railroad laws were not
regarded as judicial proceedings, even though subject to judicial
review and supervision.7 6 And, as noted above, the Michigan Air
Line case was cited. But we have already learned that the Michigan
Air Line case seems to stand only for the proposition that the
statute involved there requires a non-technical proceeding with
regard to rulings of law and evidence. In the Toledo, Ann Arbor
case, however, the Michigan Air Line case seems to be cited for the
proposition that the constitution requires such non-technical pro-
ceedings. This leads to the Chamberlin case, cited by the court in
the Toledo, Ann Arbor opinion.
Chamberlin v. Brown77 was decided in 1845, and concerned a
proceeding under a Forcible Entry and Detainer statute78 which
required justices of the peace "to cause to come before them twelve
discreet men, of lawful age, who shall be qualified to serve as
jurors in the circuit court, at the same time and place appointed
for the trial. . . ." The jury was to try the forcible entry or de-
tainer, and return its verdict. The judge was to enter judgment
according to the verdict. Certiorari was brought, on the grounds,
inter alia, that one of the justices in the proceedings below had
erred in charging the jury. The Supreme Court refused to con-
sider this as error because the lower court was not a court of rec-
ord, but one of "special and limited jurisdiction, not according
to the course of the common law, but specially provided for and
regulated by statute.... [I]n the latter case, the jury are the judges
of the law and the facts; and the correctness of their verdict, must
be tested by an examination of the merits of the case. . . .79 The
Michigan Supreme Court indicated that, "It does not appear from
the facts presented in this case, that the verdict is not consistent
with the law or the merits of the case." The statute required that,
"The supreme court, on hearing of such cause on certiorari shall
proceed to determine the same according to the right and justice
76 Id. at 462.
772 Doug. (Mich.) 120 (1845) (note decision).
78 Mich. Rev. Stat. (1838) p. 490, c. 5, as amended.
792 Doug. (Mich.) 120 at 122 (1845).
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of the case, on a review of the facts, as well as of the matters of
law . ..",10 and it seems possible that the court in this case was
merely indicating that under this statute it could not review iso-
lated errors of law such as an incorrect instruction to the jury, but
must review the whole merits.
81
But the Toledo, Ann Arbor case cites Chamberlin v. Brown
for the proposition that the jury is judge of law and fact. 12
The constitutional limitations placed on condemnation pro-
ceedings by the Toledo, Ann Arbor case seem all the more strange
in view of the fact that a case just prior to it83 upheld detailed in-
structions to a jury by a judge in a condemnation suit under a
different statute.
At this point it is interesting to compare the statement made
by the Michigan Supreme Court in an 1838 unreported decision. 4
Although this case was not reported until 1945 and therefore
could hardly be considered to have been precedent for the nine-
teenth century cases, nevertheless it may indicate the existence of
a general opinion regarding the law prior to 1850. In a case of
certiorari to a justice of the peace on a contract action, the court
said:
"-The justice committed manifest error, in directing the
jury, as to matters of fact, after the cause was submitted to
them by the parties - In justice's Courts, the jury are judges
of the law as well as of facts, and the justice had no authority,
whatever, after the cause was submitted, to direct the jury
how to find -we think it would be dangerous to tolerate
such a practice -"
The Toledo, Ann Arbor case has been frequently cited for the
proposition that the jury5 or commissioners86 are judges of law
as well as fact in condemnation cases. But even if one admits that
80 Mich. Rev. Stat. (1838) p. 490, c. 5, as amended.
81 Two subsequent cases under the same statute cited Chamberlin for the proposi-
tion that the reviewing court must examine the facts as well as the law. See Latimer v.
Woodward, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 368 (1846), and Caswell v. Ward, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 374 (1846).
82 In so doing the court may have been relying on an over-broad generalization con-
tained in a headnote to the Chamberlin case, note 79 supra, which states: "It seems that
the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts, in all courts of special and limited
jurisdiction, derived from the statute, and whose proceedings are regulated by the statute,
and are not according to the course of the common law."
83 Grand Rapids & Indiana R. Co. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393 at 400, 11 N.W. 212 (1882).
84 BLUME, UNREPORTED OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN 1836-1843, p. 17
(1945), reporting Burhans v. Reynolds, January 19, 1838. See p. 20.
85 See, e.g., Hart v. Lindley, 50 Mich. 20 at 21, 14 N.W. 682 (1883).
86 Port Huron & South-Western R. Co. v. Voorheis, 50 Mich. 506 at 510, 15 N.W. 882
(1883).
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the condemnation jury is not strictly a common-law jury under
the Michigan constitution, and further admits that there are cer-
tain characteristics of the jury nevertheless required by the con-
stitution (beyond those explicitly stated), yet it does not neces-
sarily follow that the constitution requires the jury to be judge
of law and fact. It is certainly possible that the Toledo, Ann Arbor
case was stretching a point in arguing from the Michigan Air Line
case (which turned on a statute) and from analogy to cases before
justices of the peace (as in the Chamberlin case) that the constitu-
tion required the jury to be judge of law and fact. The phrase
"judge of law and fact" itself is highly ambiguous and can lead to
a number of different specific characteristics in the condemnation
jury. Some of these specific characteristics will be discussed next.
IV. Characteristics of the Condemnation Jury
Certain specific characteristics of the condemnation jury, as
defined by the Michigan Supreme Court, indicate the outlines and
the influence of the principles that the jury is a "special tribunal"
and "judge of law and fact."
A. Before Trial
The procedures prior to the time of trial, such as initiation
of the proceeding and the impaneling of the jury, have generally
not been restricted by any constitutional requirements developed
by the Michigan court, although subject of course to the explicit
requirements that the jury must be of twelve 8 7 freeholders8 from
the vicinity."9 Most problems in this stage of the proceedings are
solved by reference to the authorizing statutes 0 or by analogy with
other statutes 1 Indeed, the court has stated that beyond "pro-
8t Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276 (1866); Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors, 71 Mich.
438, 39 N.W. 578 (1888); but this requirement may be waived, Weber v. Detroit, 158 Mich.
149, 122 N.W. 570 (1909).
88 This requirement may also be waived, Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R.
Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519 (1871).
89 As to the meaning of "vicinity," see 8 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE,
Eminent Domain §85 (1958), and Matter of Convers, 18 Mich. 459 (1869).
90 See 8 CALLAGHAN's MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE, Eminent Domain §§79-80 (1958).
See, e.g., Peninsular Ry. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18 at 26 (1870), where the court held a
jury illegally constituted because several members were interested, saying, "We are not
called upon to express any opinion as to the power of the Legislature to authorize such
stockholders to sit as jurors; as we are satisfied that they have not attempted it."
91 Kundinger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355 at 360-362, 26 N.W. 634 (1886), which stated
that the question of personal notice or notice by publication was within the legislature's
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ceedings in court to select a jury, and subsequent proceedings to
determine whether the action of the jury should be sustained... ,"
the courts have no part in the condemnation matter 9 2 leading
possibly to the negative inference that the court does have a part,
before and after the trial by jury, analogous to its part in other
civil proceedings.
B. Admission and Exclusion of Evidence
The problem of admissibility of evidence before a condemna-
tion jury poses two questions. First, can the judge attending the
jury exclude evidence or is this part of the jury's function as
"judge of law and fact?" Second, if a ruling as to admissibility
of evidence is incorrect, whether made by the judge or the jury,
can a higher court reverse for that reason?
Concerning the first question, the writer has found no case
in Michigan where a condemnation proceeding was set aside
merely because the judge attended the jury and ruled on the ad-
mission of* evidence.9 3 On the contrary, the Michigan court has
refused to disturb a condemnation award where the judge did
attend and rule on the evidence, over the objection of appealing
counsel that the "presiding judge made himself a controlling and
constraining member of the constitutional tribunal, and thus
rendered the proceedings void."94 Similarly, the court has affirmed
condemnation proceedings at which a judge excluded evidence he
felt was inadmissible.9 5 But a judge need not be in attendance,
it seems, where "the statute plainly assumes that the jury may
conduct the inquiry without the aid of any legal expert. .. ."9g
If rulings on evidence admissibility are considered a question
of law or fact, it would seem that allowing a judge to rule on those
questions is inconsistent with the jury's being "judge of law and
discretion, but since most legislation requires personal notice, the court feels that the'
jury trial in the instant case implies personal notice.
92Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456 at 462, 11
N.W. 271 (1882). See also In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, 306 Mich. 373
at 389, 10 N.W. (2d) 920 (1943).
93 See 8 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIVIL JUIuSPRUDENCE, Eminent Domain §107 et seq.
(1958).
94 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 103 Mich. 556 at 563, 61 N.W. 787 (1895).
See also Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456, 11 N.W. 271
(1882).
95 In re Widening of Fulton Street, 248 Mich. 13 (1929), reported under the name of
City of Grand Rapids v. Barth at 226 N.W. 690 (1929); City of Kalamazoo v. Balkema,
252 Mich. 308, 233 N.W. 325 (1930).
96 Note 70 supra.
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fact." Possibly this inconsistency is resolved by saying that the
judge's rulings "must at most be advisory . . ." as did one case. 97
Statutes sometimes say that the judge "may attend said jury, to
decide questions of law and administer oaths . . ."98 or that the
jury "shall hear, in the presence and under direction of the court,
evidence touching the matters. . . -99 These seem to indicate the
opinion of the legislature that it can require strict adherence to a
judge's rulings on evidence, despite court insistence that the judge
act in an advisory capacity only.100
Regarding the second question, the Michigan Air Line case
initiated the rule, under a statute,101 that "a very large discretion
in admitting and rejecting testimony is left to the jury, or the
attending officer . . ." and that an award will not be disturbed
on account of such rulings "unless it is fairly evident . . . that
the ruling ... was a cause of substantial injustice .... ,,io2 The
Michigan court has on occasion reiterated the "substantial injus-
tice" rule'0 3 and has been very reluctant to overturn a condemna-
tion award on grounds of an incorrect ruling on evidence made
at the trial level, because "in condemnation cases ... strict rules
as to the admissibility of testimony are not always enforced.... ",104
The court seems to feel that in condemnation cases the jury can
rely partly on its own knowledge. 0 5
Consequently, even though incompetent evidence has been
presented to the jury, the Michigan Supreme Court has affirmed
an award, stating, "It is not to be presumed that the incompetent
evidence which was introduced regarding benefits influenced their
judgment any more than the same evidence would if it had come
to them when acting merely as citizens buying and selling the
land .... ,06 On the other hand, the court has used, as grounds
inter alia for reversing an award, the fact that hearsay and opinion
evidence was improperly admitted,' 07 despite the fact that the
97 Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456 at 466, II
N.W. 271 (1882).
98 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§22.224, 22.329.
99 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §8.3.
100 As in Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456, 11
N.W. 271 (1882).
101See above, Part III-B.
102 Michigan Air Line Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 44 Mich. 222 at 227, 6 N.W. 651 (1880).
103 In re Parkside Housing Project, 290 Mich. 582, 287 N.W. 571 (1939).
104 Detroit v. Fidelity Realty Co., 213 Mich. 448 at 454, 182 N.W. 140 (1921).
105 In re Widening of Michigan Avenue, 299 Mich. 544 at 549, 300 N.W. 877 (1941).
106 Detroit, Bay City & Western R. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Yale, 196 Mich. 660 at
664, 163 N.W. 97 (1917).
107 Grand Rapids v. Coit, 149 Mich. 668 at 674, 113 N.W. 362 (1907).
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applicable statute stated that "the supreme court ... may affirm,
or for any substantial error reverse the judgment .. ."108 The
supreme court has also reversed on grounds, inter alia, that valid
evidence was improperly rejected, although it seemed to indicate
that substantial injustice did result from the error.'0 9 Some stat-
utes, like the one above, suggest a "substantial error" rule,110
and one allows the trial court to set aside a verdict for "objections
of law and for matters of substance, but not for objections as to
matters of form .... -"I' These suggest that the legislature feels
it has the power, at least, to dispense with technicalities of evi-
dence in condemnation proceedings.
In summary, the Michigan court's reluctance to overturn a
condemnation award on technical grounds of evidence seems con-
sistent with the idea of the condemnation jury being a "special
tribunal." But the fact that the court will sometimes overrule the
proceedings on technical evidentiary grounds, and that it will
allow judges to attend the juries and rule on evidence without
mention of the rulings being "advisory" seems inconsistent with
the idea of the condemnation jury being "judge of law and fact."
In light of the conflicting opinions, and the fact that usually
the court does not state precisely whether its decision is based
on the constitution or merely on statutory interpretation, analogy,
and public policy, it is doubtful whether any definitive conclu-
sion can be reached concerning the questions (1) can the judge
attending the jury making binding evidentiary rulings or (2) can
the supreme court reverse for incorrect evidentiary rulings not
causing substantial injustice? Since policies of saving expense
and time and the idea that the freeholder juror has knowledge
of his own in these cases - concepts analogous to modern adminis-
trative tribunals - combine to support the negative of the two above
questions, it may be that statutes clearly requiring affirmative
answers will never be passed. If so, the Michigan court may never
be called on to render a decision as to the constitutional necessity
of negative answers.
C. Instructing the Jury
Although early opinions suggested that a judge could instruct
the jury in condemnation cases, the Toledo, Ann Arbor case in-
108 Act No. 124, Pub. Acts 1883, as amended. See Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §8.56.
109 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 92 Mich. 33 at 55, 52 N.W. 790 (1892).
110 See note 108 supra, and Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §8.25.
111 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §9.1115.
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dicated that if the judge did, his instructions would "at most be
advisory... 112 since the jury are to be "judges of law and fact."
The question of what part a judge can play in instructing the
condemnation jury in the principles of law has been the subject
of some conflict in the cases, and it is difficult to know exactly
what the position of the Michigan Supreme Court is on this ques-
tion.
It seems clear that the trial judge may instruct the jury as to
his views on the law,"1 3 but there are many statements in the
cases to the effect that the judge acts "in an advisory capacity,"
that the jury "are not to be interfered with or dictated to by the
judge,"114 and that the judge "cannot give binding instructions."" 5
That this rule is dearly considered to be a constitutional require-
ment is indicated by those cases which hold that a judge is cor-
rect in telling a jury his instructions are purely advisory even
though the statute governing the proceedings requires the jury
to "be instructed as to its duties and the law of the case by the
judge of the court. . .. "I'll
Despite this stated rule, however, the writer has found no
case which reverses a condemnation proceeding where the judge
instructed the jury correctly, even though he did not tell them
his remarks were purely advisory. On the contrary, there are many
cases where the judge has charged the jury and the Michigan
Supreme Court has upheld the proceeding without any nota-
tion that the judge indicated to the jury that his remarks were
advisory.117 Possibly this is because there was no prejudice result-
ing from the error if the instructions were correct.
Even if the judge's charge to the jury is incorrect, language
used in at least one case indicates that the court will not over-
rule the proceeding unless "some ruling or instruction of the
judge is dearly erroneous, and leads to the plain conclusion that
112 See Part III-B above.
113 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 103 Mich. 556 at 558, 61 N.W. 787 (1895).
See 8 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE, Eminent Domain §102 (1958).
114 In re Widening of Bagley Avenue, 248 Mich. 1 at 4, 226 N.W. 688 (1929).
115 In re Acquisition of Land for Civic Center, 335 Mich. 582 at 591, 56 N.W. (2d)
887 (1953). See also note 105 supra, and 8 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIvIrL JURISPRUDFNcE,
Eminent Domain §102 (1958).
116 In re Widening Harper Avenue, 237 Mich. 684 at 686, 213 N.W. 74 (1927).
117 Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Hall, 133 Mich. 302, 94 N.W. 1066 (1903);
Grand Rapids v. Luce, 92 Mich. 92, 52 N.W. 635 (1892); Allegan v. Vonasek, 261 Mich.
16, 245 N.W. 557 (1932); In re Petition of the City of Detroit for a Park Site, 227 Mich.
132, 198 N.W. 839 (1924).
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the jury were thereby prejudiced against respondents."11 This
suggests that the "advisory only" rule of instructions may ac-
tually make it harder for a party to get a case reversed on the
grounds that an incorrect rule of law was applied, since the in-
struction did not technically bind the jury. Most cases, however,
do reverse on grounds, inter alia, of incorrect instructions 19 even
when the judge states that he is merely giving the jury his opinion
and advice.120 Thus, as a practical matter, since courts will reverse
for incorrect instructions even though they are merely advisory,
it can be argued that the "advisory only" rule has no real influence
on the proceeding where the judge does attend and give his
opinions on the law. The jury in all probability will follow those
instructions as carefully as it would in an ordinary common law
civil trial.
Most cases indicate that the judge has no duty to advise the
jury on the law in a condemnation case, at least where no statute
requires them to do so.121 However, one case states, "It is the duty
of the court to interfere where matters foreign to the issue are
rehearsed before the jury, prejudicial to the interests of a
party. . . 1
Where does this leave our "special tribunal" which is "judge
of law and fact"? Regarding rulings on questions of law, at least,
it seems that the judge can in any case advise the jury as to his
opinion what the law is, as long as he tells them his remarks are
merely advisory. In fact, it seems that the judge may omit tell-
ing them his remarks are only advisory if the judge is correct as
to his opinion of law. If the judge is wrong in his opinion of law,
then the higher court will usually reverse (unless it can be shown
the opinion did not control or prejudice the jury) and it seems
that reversal will result even if the judge told the jury his remarks
were advisory. In essence, then, if the judge instructs, it seems
that he can do so in about the same way as in ordinary common law
trials. The primary difference of condemnation proceedings from
ordinary common law proceedings with regard to instructions is
the fact that the judge has no normal duty to instruct, unless some
118 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 103 Mich. 556 at 558, 61 N.W. 787 (1895).
119 In re Board of Education of City of Grand Rapids, 249 Mich. 550, 229 N.W. 470
(1930); Grand Rapids v. Coit, 149 Mich. 668, 113 N.W. 362 (1907).
120 Allegan v. Vonasek, 261 Mich. 16, 245 N.W. 557 (1932).
121 Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Detroit & Bay City R. Co., 64 Mich. 350, 31 N.W.
281 (1887); McDuffee v. Fellows, 157 Mich. 664, 122 N.W. 276 (1909).
'22 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 92 Mich. 33, 52 N.W. 790 (1892).
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legislation requires him to do so. And even if legislation requires
him to instruct, he may (or must) indicate to the jury that his state-
ments are merely advisory.
Many statutes seem to contemplate instructions by the judge,
stating that "The jury . . . shall be instructed as to their duties
and the law of the case by the court . . ."123 and that the judge
"may attend said jury, to decide questions of law.. .- 124 but once
again the court can interpret these to mean "advisory" instruc-
tions, thus avoiding the constitutional question of the legislature's
power to prescribe binding instructions.
D. Court Control and Review
Although the jury is "judge of law and fact" in a condemna-
tion proceeding, the Michigan court has intimated that before and
after the trial in front of the jury, the judges have control . 25 If
the rule of "jury as judge of law and fact" is to have any real
meaning, however, it seems logical that the power of the judges
before and after trial to control the jury and its verdict will not
be as extensive as in a common law trial. The cases bear this out.
There are two stages of the proceedings to examine here: (1) the
control of the trial judge over the jury verdict and judgment, and
(2) the review of the proceedings by an appellate court.
The basic power of the trial judge to control the jury's find-
ings is the power not to confirm the award, or the power to set
aside the proceeding and order a new trial. The Fort Street Union
Depot case firmly establishes this power, although there was no
serious challenge to his power before this case, and specifies the
situations in which the court felt a judge was justified in setting
aside an award, as follows:
"1. If it is found by the court that there has been fraud
or misconduct upon the part of the jury affecting the rights
of the parties.
2. For gross errors or mistakes of the jury.
3. For the erroneous rejection or admission of testimony
affecting the rights of the parties.
4. For errors of such extraordinary character or grossness
as furnish a just inference of the existence of undue influence,
2Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §9.1115. See also §§5.1436, 5.1862, 8.19.
124 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §22.329. See also §22.224.
125 See Part IV-A and note 92 supra.
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partiality, bias, and prejudice, or unfaithfulness in the dis-
charge of the duty imposed.
5. When it is apparent to the court that the damages
awarded are either inadequate or excessive."126
Cases have held, however, that the judge cannot grant a motion to
modify the verdict,127 nor require consent to raise in the amount
of the award on pain of ordering a new trial (additur),' 2 nor
require consent to a lower award on pain of the same penalty
(remittitur).129 Nor can the court dismiss the condemnation
proceedings, at least where jurisdiction has been obtained and
no statute authorizes dismissal. 30 Certainly these limitations are
consistent with the notion that the jury is judge of law and fact.
However, if the judge has the power to accomplish the same ends
by ordering a new trial, it seems merely to be choosing the more
expensive route to limit the judge's other controls.
Some statutory authorizations of condemnation proceedings
seem to imply that the legislature intended, in some instances,
to give judges in condemnation cases control over juries similar
to common law cases, the statutes stating that the jury "shall be
instructed ... and shall retire under the charge of an officer and
render their verdict in the same manner as on the trial of an ordi-
nary civil case .... "131 One statute even goes so far as to say, "The
verdict of the jury may be set aside by the court and a new trial
ordered for objections of law and for matters of substance, in the
same manner and on the same ground as an ordinary civil action
in courts of general jurisdiction .... ,u12 It seems that the legis-
lature does not have as much confidence in the jury as the courts
do.
Appellate review of condemnation proceedings can be obtained
126 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 92 Mich. 33 at 42, 52 N.W. 790 (1892).
127 Grand Rapids, Grand Haven & Muskegon Ry. Co. v. Stevens, 143 Mich. 646, 107
N.W. 436 (1906).
128 Grand Rapids v. Coit, 149 Mich. 668, 113 N.W. 362 (1907).
129 In re Owen and Memorial Parks in City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 377, 221 N.W. 274
(1928).
130 In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, 306 Mich. 373, 10 N.W. (2d) 920
(1943).
181 See Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§5.1436, 5.1862, 8.19, 8.49. But see §5.2520 which
states that "the decision of such jury shall be final and conclusive in the premises, unless
an appeal ... shall be taken .. "
132 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §9.1115.
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by appeal,133 by certiorari,'14 and, sometimes, even by mandamus.135
The scope of appellate review in the case of review of evidentiary
questions and in the case of review of a judge's instructions has
already been mentioned. The Michigan Supreme Court has never
hesitated to review and reverse when necessary because of an error
of law relied on by the jury to determine either necessity'36 or the
amount of the award. 3
7
Concerning the amount of the award, the Michigan Supreme
Court found no ground for disturbing an award where "the record
shows that each award was between the maximum and minimum
amounts as testified to by the various witnesses .. "138 But the
court has reversed when the award was inadequate' 39 or too high
140
due to the application of a wrong rule of law. The court has stated
that the jury has a great deal of discretion in determining the
amount of the award,' 41 and has indicated it will not set aside
an award unless it is "grossly against the overwhelming weight
of evidence .... -142 Similar discretion is granted for a finding
of necessity, and the court will not overturn one if "there was
evidence to support the verdict .... -143
Conclusion
What is the Michigan condemnation jury proceeding? The
Michigan Supreme Court has said that it is an "appraisal," but
in another case it has stated that it is not a "mere appraisal."' 44
133 Chicago, Detroit & Canada Grand Trunk Junction R. Co. v. Simons, 200 Mich. 76,
166 N.W. 960 (1918); and see Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §8.24.
134 People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57 (1870); Dunlap v. Toledo, Ann Arbor & Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 46 Mich. 190, 9 N.W. 249 (1881).
135 Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 92 Mich. 33, 52 N.W. 790 (1892).
136 Commissioners of Parks and Boulevards of the City of Detroit v. Moesta, 91 Mich.
149, 51 N.W. 903 (1892).
137 Ibid.; Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Ry. Co. v. Detroit, Lansing & Northern
R. Co., 62 -Mich. 564, 29 N.W. 500 (1886); In re Widening of Woodward Avenue, 265 Mich.
87, 251 N.W. 379 (1933); In re Widening of Woodward Ave., 304 Mich. 417, 8 N.W. (2d)
120 (1943).
138 In re Widening Harper Avenue, 237 Mich. 684 at 687, 213 N.W. 74 (1927).
139 Chicago, Detroit & Canada Grand Trunk Junction R. Co. v. Simons, 200 Mich. 76,
166 N.W. 960 (1918).
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The court has called it a "jury of inquest" or "inquisition," but
contrary to the rule followed in some inquests has denied that
the judge could give binding advice. The court has said that
the condemnation jury is not a common-law jury, but in another
case it has said that it was 'like a common-law jury. The court
has termed it a "special tribunal," but has said that certain charac-
teristics are implied by the term "jury." It must be concluded
that the Michigan condemnation jury cannot be comprehensively
defined by reference to any single analogy or category. It is a body
which adjudicates the matter of necessity and the amount of award
in certain condemnation cases, and has explicitly stated characteris-
tics of "twelve free-holders, residing in the vicinity. . . ." It also
has a number of characteristics required implicitly by the term
"jury." In order to tell what, implicit characteristics the condem-
nation jury has, a lawyer must examine the cases in detail.
One of the common phrases associated with the Michigan
condemnation jury by the courts is "judge of law and fact," a
designation seemingly drawn from analogy to statutory proceedings
with a jury before a justice of the peace, and influenced by a
Michigan case that turned on a statute. This phrase is ambiguous
enough that by itself it has little meaning, and to determine its
content one must still examine the cases to determine whether a
particular characteristic, is required in condemnation jury pro-
ceedings. When this is done, however, it is found that some
characteristics attached to the condemnation jury do not neces-
sarily appear consistent with the "judge of law and fact" idea.
Nevertheless the phrase seems to have influenced a number of
decisions. Although precedent has firmly established this phrase
in the law of Michigan, its somewhat dubious origins suggest the
possibility that the Michigan Supreme Court would hesitate to
employ this ambiguous terminology as the basis for establishing
any additional characteristics as constitutional requirements. It
also remains to be seen what will occur when and if a case comes
up for review in which the question is whether the jury must be
"judge of law and fact" as a matter of constitutional law, in oppo-
sition to clear legislative intent to the contrary.
Many characteristics which the Michigan court applies to the
condemnation jury can, on close scrutiny, be shown to stem
from a statute or from analogy with other statutes or the common
law. One possible reason why the Michigan court has imposed
certain common-law-like characteristics on the condemnation jury
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in circumstances where there is doubt whether the court means
the requirement to rest on a constitutional basis or not is that
when legislation involved is silent the court may nevertheless feel
that certain characteristics are needed as a matter of fairness. It
is easy then for the court to suggest that the characteristics are im-
plied by the constitution in the term "jury," although if clear
legislative intent to the contrary were involved the court might
not make such characteristic a requirement.
John H. Jackson, S.Ed.
